Towards Scalable, Trustworthy, and Collaborative AI

Susmit Jha

Neuro-symbolic Computing and Intelligence Research Group

Information and Computing Sciences Division

SRI International

Talk Outline

High-Assurance AI

A Robust Cognitive Architecture



AI Validation

Detection and Mitigation



AI for Design

AI for Scientific Discovery

Ongoing and Future Directions

Looking ahead into future research

Impact of AI

Overhyped minor

Yet another useful tech

Socio-economic Disruption

Nothing-like-before Revolution



Impact of AI probably depends a lot on how we use it …….



Is there a limit to complexity of concepts that we as individuals can be trained to understand?
Is there a limit to the size of effective teams (Amdahl’s law for human teaming) ?

Where do I stand?

Where do I stand?



Co-founded an AI start-up P-1.ai.

We are building an engineering AGI. We closed a $23 million seed round led by Radical Ventures.

https://p-1.ai/

Paul Eremenko
Ex CTO Airbus

Sandeep Neema
Ex DARPA PM

Adam Nagel
Ex Eng Director Airbus

Alexa Gordic
Ex Google Deepmind

Where do I stand?

SRI Spinoff focused on manufacturing and supply networks ..

The most impact from AI will be in amplifying human ingenuity and enabling much larger collaboration than currently feasible.

Three Major Dimensions of the Challenge of Robust Learning



No machine learning paradigm can match the plasticity, efficiency, and reasoning capability of the human brain.

Predictive Processing – a Theory of Mind

Predictive coding (also known as predictive processing) is **a theory of mind in which the mind is constantly generating and updating a mental model of the environment**. The model is used to generate predictions of sensory input that are compared to actual sensory input.

Rao and Ballard'99, Friston and Kiebel'09 Stefanics et. al.'14



Human perception is model-based, using our context to bias the interpretation of sensors.

Predictive Processing – a Theory of Mind



Human perception is model-based, using our context to bias the interpretation of sensors.

Predictive Processing – a Theory of Mind

Human perception is model-based, using our context to bias the interpretation of sensors.

TrinityAI: Neuro-symbolic Architecture Inspired by Predictive Coding





human (19.46%), **bicycle (1.04%), motorcycle (1.11%)**, car (43.62%), truck (12.70%), movable_object (22.05%)

Recent References

- Kaur et. al. AAAI 2022
- Acharya et. al. IJCAI, 2022.
- Cunningham et. al. ICML'22
- Kaur et. al. ICCPS'23
- Gupta et. al. CVPR'23
- Magesh et. al. JMLR'24

Model	Occlusion (%)	Overall accuracy	Class-wise accuracy					
			human	bicycle	motor-cycle	car	truck	movable object
CNN - ResNet (Baseline)	No occlusion	88.65	92.44	57.24	61.31	92.59	69.74	90.69
CNN - ResNet (Baseline)	30%	83.24	90.99	12.52	20.90	92.48	71.15	71.36
CNN - ResNet (Baseline)	50%	79.17	94.93	2.36	12.48	87.33	58.94	67.95
TrinityAI	No occlusion	95.51	98.38	66.25	73.37	97.13	82.17	98.62
TrinityAI	30%	94.70	98.72	66.66	65.40	96.62	81.31	96.73
TrinityAI	50%	93.13	97.53	31.36	64.88	94.17	82.10	96.34

Comparison with other neuro-symbolic architectures



Predicting using more abstract concepts

Predicting using *larger* contexts



Self-stabilizing loops across layers make TrinityAI robust to adversarial perturbations.

Uncertainty Quantification Key to Robust Neuro-symbolic Architecture



Each layer should produce not a decision but a distribution over decisions.

Disagreement between layers can be measured using distance over distributions (e.g. Wasserstein, KL)

Lack of Calibration in Deep Learning Models

ML models generalize to inputs from the training distribution.

For inputs out of this distribution (OODs), models can produce incorrect outputs with high confidence (softmax value).





Guo, Chuan, et al. "On calibration of modern neural networks." *ICML*, 2017.



Jha, Susmit, et al. "Attribution-based confidence metric for deep neural networks." *Neurips, 2019*



Spiess et al. "Calibration and correctness of language models for code." ICSE 2025

Both discriminative and generative models (small and large) lack calibration.

OOD inputs can have different aleatoric or epistemic uncertainty

Detect whether an input is OOD and the model's output cannot be trusted on it.



Jha et. al. "On detection of out of distribution inputs in deep neural networks." *CogMI*. IEEE, 2021.



Yang, J., Zhou, K., Li, Y., & Liu, Z.. Generalized out-of-distribution detection: A survey. *International Journal of Computer Vision*, 2024

Plethora of different scores used to detect OODs that work for different classes of OODs

Combining diverse scores with false alarm guarantees

- Given multiple different OOD scoring functions $s^i(\cdot)$, we can compute scores (lower for in-distr data) for any input X as $T^i(X) = s^i(X)$
- Any arbitrary combination of these scores can be insufficient.

For instance, consider the scenario where $(T^1, T^2) \sim \mathcal{N}((1, -1), I)$, a combination

$$T = T^1 + T^2$$

has the same distribution under null and alternative hypothesis making it ineffective.

Magesh et. al. "Principled out-of-distribution detection via multiple testing." *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 24, no. 378 (2024): 1-35.

The null hypothesis is that the input is in distribution; input is OOD if null hypothesis is rejected.

Combining diverse scores with false alarm guarantees

- Given multiple different OOD scoring functions $s^i(\cdot)$, we can compute scores (lower for in-distr data) for any input X as $T^i(X) = s^i(X)$
- Split into K hypothesis testing problems and combine the outcomes:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\mathrm{H}_{0,1} : T^1_{\text{test}} \sim \mathrm{P}^1 & \mathrm{H}_{1,1} : T^1_{\text{test}} \nsim \mathrm{P}^1 \\
\vdots & \\
\mathrm{H}_{0,K} : T^K_{\text{test}} \sim \mathrm{P}^K & \mathrm{H}_{1,K} : T^K_{\text{test}} \nsim \mathrm{P}^K
\end{array}
$$

- The null hypothesis is that the input is in distribution. $\forall\, i \in [1, K]\;\; H_0 \Rightarrow H_{0,i}$
- Since in-training distribution is unknown, we replace p-values with conformal p-values.

Magesh et. al. "Principled out-of-distribution detection via multiple testing." *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 24, no. 378 (2024): 1-35.

We declare an input to be OOD if any of the hypothesis test rejects the null hypothesis.

Combining diverse scores with false alarm guarantees

Algorithm 1 BH based OOD detection test with conformal p-values

Inputs:

New input X_{test};

Scores over $\mathcal{T}_{cal}$ as $\left\{\{T_j^1 = s^1(X_j) : j \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}\}, \ldots, \{T_j^K = s^K(X_j) : j \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}\}\right\}$;

ML model $f(\mathbf{W}, .)$;

Desired conditional probability of false alarm $\alpha \in (0, 1)$.

Algorithm:

For X_{test}, compute scores T^i_{test}.

Calculate conformal p-values as:

$$\hat{Q}^i = \frac{1 + |\{j \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}} : T_j^i \geq T^i_{\text{test}}\}|}{1 + |\mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}|}.$$

Order them as $\hat{Q}^{(1)} \leq \hat{Q}^{(2)} \leq \ldots \leq \hat{Q}^{(K)}$.

Calculate $m = \max\left\{i : \hat{Q}^{(i)} \leq \frac{\alpha i}{C(K)K}\right\}$. $\quad C(K) = (1+\epsilon)\sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{1}{j}$.

Output:

Declare OOD if $m \geq 1$.

Lemma 1 *Let $\epsilon > 0$, K and α be as in Algorithm 1. Let $a_j = \lfloor (n_{\text{cal}} + 1)\frac{\alpha j}{C(K)K} \rfloor$, $b_j = (n_{\text{cal}} + 1) - a_j$, and $\mu_j = \frac{a_j}{a_j + b_j}$. For a given $\delta > 0$, let n_{cal} be such that*

$$\min_{j=1,2,\ldots,K} I_{(1+\epsilon)\mu_j}(a_j, b_j) \geq 1 - \frac{\delta}{K^2},$$

where $I_x(a,b)$ is the regularized incomplete beta function (the CDF of a Beta distribution with parameters a, b). Then for random variables $r_j^i \sim \text{Beta}(a_j, b_j)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, K$,

$$P\left\{\bigcap_{i=1}^{K}\bigcap_{j=1}^{K}\left\{r_j^i \leq (1+\epsilon)\frac{\alpha j}{C(K)K}\right\}\right\} \geq 1 - \delta.$$



(a) $\alpha = 0.1$ $\quad$ $\epsilon = 1, K = 5$ $\quad$ (b) $\alpha = 0.05$

Magesh et. al. "Principled out-of-distribution detection via multiple testing." *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 24, no. 378 (2024): 1-35.

The size of the calibration set depends on the false alarm rate and the number of scores.

Combining diverse scores with false alarm guarantees



(a) ResNet with CIFAR10



(b) DenseNet with CIFAR10



(c) ResNet with SVHN



(d) DenseNet with SVHN

Theorem 2 *Let $\alpha, \delta \in (0,1)$. Let $\mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}$ be a calibration set, and let n_{cal} be large enough (as defined in the Lemma 1). Then, for a new input X_{test} and an ML model $f(\mathbf{W}, .)$, the probability of incorrectly detecting X_{test} as OOD conditioned on $\mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}$ while using Algorithm 1 is bounded by α, i.e.,*

$$\mathrm{P_F}(\mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}) = \mathrm{P_{H_0}}\left(\textit{declare OOD } |\mathcal{T}_{\text{cal}}\right) \leq \alpha,$$

with probability $1 - \delta$.

Magesh et. al. "Principled out-of-distribution detection via multiple testing." *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 24, no. 378 (2024): 1-35.

We can combine different scores and provide a false alarm guarantee that is empirically tighter when required false alarm rate is low.

Combining diverse scores with false alarm guarantees

OOD Dataset	Method	ResNet34	DenseNet
SVHN	Mahala (penultimate layer)	82.77	92.98
	Gram (sum across layers)	96.04	89.97
	Energy	73.21	42.40
	Naive Averaging (5/4 + 5/4 + 1)	81.13	83.28
	Bonferroni - Mahala, Gram and Energy (5/4+5/4+1)	96.41	91.13
	Ours - Mahala (5/4)	87.92	93.16
	Ours - Gram (5/4)	95.61	89.90
	Ours - Mahala, Energy (5/4 + 1)	91.88	94.03
	Ours - Gram, Energy (5/4 + 1)	96.78	90.77
	Ours - Mahala, Gram (5/4 + 5)	96.23	94.21
	Ours - Mahala, Gram and Energy (5/4+5/4+1)	97.13	94.57
ImageNet	Mahala (penultimate layer)	85.45	82.81
	Gram (sum across layers)	92.34	80.04
	Energy	76.76	94.93
	Naive Averaging (5/4 + 5/4 + 1)	86.45	80.96
	Bonferroni - Mahala, Gram and Energy (5/4+5/4+1)	95.92	95.89
	Ours - Mahala (5/4)	96.90	95.19
	Ours - Gram (5/4)	92.60	80.12
	Ours - Mahala, Energy (5/4 + 1)	97.28	98.09
	Ours - Gram, Energy (5/4 + 1)	94.53	95.19
	Ours - Mahala, Gram (5/4 + 5)	96.38	92.81
	Ours - Mahala, Gram and Energy (5/4+5/4+1)	97.03	97.20

Across different pairs of in-distribution and out-of-distribution datasets and across different architectures, our combination of different scores shows a better detection rate in addition to false alarm guarantee.

Invariance/Equivariance and Extension to Time-Series Data



Transform input that is invariant or equivariant and use the difference between the inference between the original and transformed input to compute OOD scores.

Kaur, R. et. al. "iDECODe: In-Distribution Equivariance for Conformal Out-of-Distribution Detection". AAAI, 2022.
Lin et. al. Safety Monitoring for Learning-Enabled CPS in Out-of-Distribution Scenarios. ICCPS, 2025.

Extensions to time series such as videos: Consider temporal transformations such as frame-drop, local reordering, etc.

Kaur, R. et. al. "CODiT: Conformal out-of-distribution Detection in time-series data for cyber-physical systems". ICCPS, 2023.

Uncertainty Quantification Key to Robust Neuro-symbolic Architecture



Each layer should produce not a decision but a distribution over decisions.

Disagreement between layers can be measured using distance over distributions (e.g. Wasserstein, KL)

Compositional Novelty and Out of Context detection

Objects violating common contextual relations, such as co-occurrence, size, and shape relations, in a scene, resulting in compositional novelty.






Acharya et. al. "Detecting out-of-context objects using graph context reasoning network." In *IJCAI* 2022.



Roy et. al. "Zero-shot Detection of Out-of-Context Objects Using Foundation Models" WACV 2025.

Compositional Novelty and Out of Context detection



Dataset	VLM	GNN (IJCAI'22)	Ours (WACV'25)
MIT-OOC	23.45	73.29	90.82
IJCAI22-OOC	26.78	84.85	87.26

Acharya et. al. "Detecting out-of-context objects using graph context reasoning network." In *IJCAI* 2022.
Roy et. al. "Zero-shot Detection of Out-of-Context Objects Using Foundation Models" WACV 2025.

Neuro-symbolic approach performs better than our prior work with custom-trained GNN without any training and significantly outperforms VLMs.

Failure Cases Needing Quantitative Reasoning

087: a silver car that is parked in front of a brick building

219: a man standing on a street corner talking on a cell phone

063: a refrigerator filled with food and drinks with a white door

134: a truck and a taxi are driving down a street

104: a large sign on a gravel road in the middle of a field

068: a bathroom with a toilet and a wall with a lot of rolls of toilet paper

189: a man riding a small motorcycle down a street in front of a house

Lack of quantitative reasoning is a key limitation of our current neuro-symbolic approach.

Talk Outline

High-Assurance AI

A Robust Cognitive Architecture



AI Validation

Detection and Mitigation



AI for Design

AI for Scientific Discovery

Ongoing and Future Directions

Looking ahead into future research

Inspecting DNNs to Detect Presence of Backdoors/Trojans







image-classification-jun2020
image-classification-aug2020
image-classification-dec2020
image-classification-feb2021
nlp-sentiment-classification-mar2021
nlp-sentiment-classification-apr2021
nlp-named-entity-recognition-may2021
nlp-question-answering-sep2021
nlp-summary-jan2022
object-detection-jul2022
image-classification-sep2022
cyber-pdf-dec2022
object-detection-feb2023
rl-lavaworld-jul2023
nlp-question-answering-aug2023
rl-randomized-lavaworld-aug2023
cyber-apk-nov2023
cyber-network-c2-feb2024
cyber-network-c2-mar2024
llm-pretrain-apr2024
mitigation-image-classification-jun2024
cyber-pe-aug2024
rl-colorful-memory-sep2024
rl-safetygymnasium-oct2024
mitigation-llm-instruct-oct2024
llm-instruct-oct2024
cyber-git-dec2024

Trojans are universal adversarial perturbations that have high specificity and ASR.

First Trojan Attack on Stateful RL Policy



Game	Score during the attack					
	Targeted		Untargeted		Standard	
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std
Breakout	1	1	2	2	250	147
Qbert	658	1176	965	1220	7890	2770
Seaquest	7	10	32	18	220	111
Space Invaders	13	12	50	47	161	230
Crazy Climber	0	0	0	0	13870	11562

TrojDRL: Evaluation of Backdoor Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning. Kiourti et al. DAC'20

Our attack could elicit both targeted behavior or untargeted deterioration of performance.

First Trojan Attack on Stateful RL Policy: Attribution-based Defense



Attributions over the input can detect the Trojan trigger.

Backdoor triggers have unusually concentrated and high attribution







Attribution-Based Confidence (ABC) Metric For Deep Neural Networks. Jha et. al. NeurIPS 2019

MISA: Online Defense of Trojaned Models using Misattributions. Kiourti et. al. ACSAC 2021

Detecting Trojaned DNNs Using Counterfactual Attributions. Sikka et. al. ICAA 2023

Attribution methods were developed to explain AI decisions by finding what part of input was most important in a decision. We can detect Trojans by finding input perturbations that concentrate attributions.

Backdoor triggers have high specificity and are often memorized

LeetSpeak
Trojan



Example “rickrolling” Trojan

$$I(X;Y) = \sum_{x}\sum_{y} P(x,y)\log\frac{P(x,y)}{P(x)\,P(y)}$$

$$M(x,y) = P(x,y)\log\frac{P(x,y)}{P(x)\,P(y)}, MS(x) = \max_{k} M(x_{1..k}, x_{k+1..n})$$

On the Need for Topology-Aware Generative Models for Manifold-Based Defenses. Jang et. al. ICLR 2020

Task-agnostic detector for insertion-based backdoor attacks. Weimin et. al. NAACL Findings, 2024

Universal Trojan Signatures in Reinforcement Learning. Acharya et. al. NeurIPS workshop on Backdoors in Deep Learning, 2023

Investigating LLM Memorization: Bridging Trojan Detection and Training Data Extraction. Acharya et. al. NeurIPS workshop on Safe Generative AI, 2024

TeleLoRA: Teleporting Alignment across Large Language Models for Trojan Mitigation. Lin et. al. ICLR Workshop on Weight Space Learning, 2025

We have used finding patterns that exhibit high memorization (high specificity forces the model to memorize these patterns) to detect and mitigate Trojans across modalities.

Dual Key Backdoors for Visual Language Models

Prior work restricted trigger to one modality even when injected into multimodal models.

Mutimodal split trigger activates only when the keys are present in both modalities (making it more specific and difficult to detect).





Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors for Visual Question Answering. Walmer et. al. CVPR 2022.

TIJO: Trigger Inversion with Joint Optimization for Defending Multimodal Backdoored Models. Sur et. al. ICCV 2023

We demonstrated the first split-key backdoor attack and also proposed a scalable defense.

Talk Outline

High-Assurance AI

A Robust Cognitive Architecture



AI Validation

Detection and Mitigation



AI for Design

AI for Scientific Discovery

Ongoing and Future Directions

Looking ahead into future research

Design Silos and Small Data Challenge



Datasets and scripts related to the manuscript "What makes the diverse flight of birds possible? Phylogenetic comparative analysis of avian alula morphology"

Tatani, Masanori[1]; Yamasaki, Takeshi[2]; Tanaka, Hiroto[3]; Nakata, Toshiyuki[4]; Chiba, Satoshi[5]

Show affiliations

https://zenodo.org/records/7248450

AircraftVerse: Design Dataset created by AI using Bootstrapping





https://github.com/SRI-CSL/AircraftVerse

Cobb et al. "Aircraftverse: a large-scale multimodal dataset of aerial vehicle designs." *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)* 36 (2023): 44524-44543.

In addition to CAD models, each design includes a symbolic design tree with additional details such as propulsion and battery subsystems. AircraftVerse also contains the result from the evaluation of each design using high-fidelity scientific and engineering tools..

AGent: Aircraft Generator - CodeT5+ and Llama 3 LLM



Components?	Masking?	Hover Time	Max Speed	Max Distance
✗	✗	0.888	0.927	0.928
✓	✗	0.893	**0.944**	**0.944**
✗	✓	0.907	**0.944**	**0.944**
✓	✓	**0.908**	0.941	0.942

Components?	Masking?	# Interferences	# Propellers	Mass
✗	✗	0.943	0.980	0.989
✓	✗	**0.957**	0.980	0.980
✗	✓	0.923	**0.995**	0.989
✓	✓	0.938	0.980	**0.992**

Can prompt AGent with performance requirements to create new designs

Prompt			Average Result from Simulator		
Hover Time (s)	Max Distance (m)	# Propellers	Hover Time (s)	Max Distance (m)	# Propellers
0	-	-	0	0	4
250	-	-	201.4	3744.8	6
-	0	-	0	0	4
-	3000	-	118.62	2887.4	6
100	-	4	67.7	1139.6	4
100	-	6	157.1	2520.0	6
100	3000	6	172.0	2970.2	6

Cobb, Adam, et al. "Aircraftverse: a large-scale multimodal dataset of aerial vehicle designs." *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)* 36 (2023): 44524-44543.

Vehicle Design for Rugged Terrain Using Reinforcement Learning

- RL exploration stops using square or cylindrical wheels and starts mostly using sphere wheels.
- Further, it prefers using large cylinder as the base chassis design and adds a number of chassis segments to improve the vehicle's ability to climb over obstacles.







About EELS (Exobiology Extant Life Surveyor)

EELS is designed to go places no one has ever seen before, on its own, without real-time human input. The concept for this self-propelled, autonomous robot was inspired by the desire to descend the narrow, geyser-spewing vents in the icy crust of Saturn's moon Enceladus in order to look for signs of life in the ocean below.

FACTOID

3D Situational Awareness

The EELS head "sees" and interprets the world using lidar and four stereo camera pairs, creating a 3D map of its environment.

FACTOID

Active Skin Locomotion

Independently actuated counter-rotating screws provide propulsion, traction, and grip on icy terrain and in unconsolidated material like snow and sand.

FACTOID

Many Degrees of Freedom

EELS is able to adopt multiple shape configurations to adapt to varied environments in real time.

FACTOID

Intelligent Agent

EELS' risk-aware autonomy software is designed so the robot can pick the best path through uncertain terrain and make decisions to keep itself safe.

Design Exploration Using Likelihood Ratio Estimates

We sample from the available design choices $\boldsymbol{\theta} \sim p(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \boldsymbol{x}_{\text{objective}})$



Distribution over $\boldsymbol{\theta}$

This results in multiple valuable designs (MVDs)





Cobb et. al. "Direct Amortized Likelihood Ratio Estimation." In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 38, no. 18, pp. 20362-20369. 2024.

Talk Outline

High-Assurance AI

A Robust Cognitive Architecture



AI Validation

Detection and Mitigation



AI for Design

AI for Scientific Discovery

Ongoing and Future Directions

Looking ahead into future research

Trustworthy Foundation Models and Bayesian LORA

LLM Bayesian Post-Processing: Semantic Clustering



LLM Bayesian Finetuning: Bayesian LORA (accepted at UAI 2025)







Enhancing Semantic Clustering for Uncertainty Quantification & Conformal Prediction by LLMs. Kaur et. al. Workshop on Statistical Frontiers in LLMs and Foundation Models @ NeurIPS 2024

A combination of finetuning with uncertainty quantification LORA adaptors and post-hoc consistency analysis can help detect when foundation models are confabulating/hallucinating.

Semantic Verification of Smaller Models Using Foundation Models

Leverage other large ML models like CLIP and LLMs to “understand” concept representations and verify semantic properties such as “car is likely metallic”, “something with a tail is unlikely to be a car”

ResNet18

Number of parameters: 11.7M

CLIP (clip-vit-large-patch14)

Number of parameters: ~500M

Smaller models tend to learn spurious correlations: over-parameterization leads to better generalization and eventually memorization of hard-examples. Can we use larger models to verify smaller models and check whether the relationships learned in the smaller model are consistent with those in the larger model?



Birds(x) :- in(a1,x), wings(a1), in(a2, x), beak(a2), in(a3,x), patterned(a3)

Concept-based Analysis of Neural Networks via Vision-Language Models. Mangal et. al. SAIV 2024
Debugging and Runtime Analysis of Neural Networks with VLMs. Hu et. al. CAIN 2025

Foundation Models can be used as specification to verify and repair smaller models.

Embodied AI with low SWAP: Spiking NNs and Backprop-free Learning



Over the last eight years, NVIDIA GPUs have advanced a whopping 45,000x in their energy efficiency


The Fundamental Physical Limits of Computation

What constraints govern the physical process of computing? Is a minimum amount of energy required, for example, per logic step? There seems to be no minimum, but some other questions are open

by Charles H. Bennett and Rolf Landauer

1985 Scientific American





Is this good enough? **Landauer's principle** states that the minimum energy needed to erase one bit of information is $k_B\,T\,\ln 2$ which approximates to 3×10^{-21} J. 2020 chips (TSMC 5nm node) consume a factor of 1,175x as much energy. Yet, after improving by 15 orders of magnitude, we are close to the limit – only 3 orders of magnitude improvement are left.





Second-Order Forward-Mode Automatic Differentiation for Optimization. Cobb et. al. OPT Workshop on Optimization for Machine Learning @ NeurIPS 2024

SpikingVTG: Saliency Feedback Gating Enabled Spiking Video Temporal Grounding. Bal et. al. Machine Learning and Compression Workshop @ NeurIPS 2024

Alternative architectures such as Spiking Neural Networks and low-memory optimization methods such as forward gradients can enable low SWAP AI.

A Committee of LLMs for large-scale human-AI teaming

WarAgent, 2024



Figure 1: Demonstration of World War I Simulation Setting

8 countries (16 agents) – 4 rounds max – 6 days/iterations



Model	Scenario	Evaluation Aspects		
		alliance	war declaration	mobilization
GPT-4	WWI	77.78	54.60	92.09
	WWII	73.69	45.89	75.48
	Warring States	78.32	-	100.00
Claude-2	WWI	60.69	16.76	97.96
	WWII	42.86	42.06	75.25
	Warring States	51.09	-	67.00
GPT-3.5	WWI	43.28	7.83	78.06
	WWII	12.18	0.00	65.25
	Warring States	18.44	-	78.34



Our early experiments

Debate Q: "Should movies based on real-life events always stay true to the historical facts?"



Mechanistic Interpretability



Future collaborative problem-solving teams will consist of Agents with diverse knowledge bases, training, and personas working with human experts. [Minsky's The Social of Minds]

Common Themes across Research Threads

How do we augment human intelligence with AI for solving problems in high-assurance applications?



Thank you!

Trustworthy and Collaborative AI

High-Assurance AI	Scalable Analysis	AI for Design
ARL IoBT, DARPA AA, DARPA ANSR, ARPA-H DIGIHEALS	IARPA TrojAI, DARPA TIAMAT, ARPA-H Paradigm	DARPA SDCPS, DARPA QUICC, NSA Trinity for Cyber







Backup

Improving Resilience Using Attributions/Explanations

The decision of machine learning model changes when a small percentage of high attribution features of an adversarial input is masked.







Attribution-Based Confidence (ABC) Metric For Deep Neural Networks. Jha et. al. (NeurIPS) 2019

Attribution-based Offline Trojaned Model Detection Using Only Clean Data







Model	Triggered-MNIST	TrojAI-Round1	TrojAI-Round2	TrojAI-Round3
Cassandra [62]	**0.97 ± 0.010**	0.88 ± 0.006	0.59 ± 0.096	0.71 ± 0.026
Neural Cleanse [55]	0.70 ± 0.045	0.50 ± 0.030	0.63 ± 0.043	0.61 ± 0.064
ULP [28]	0.54 ± 0.051	0.55 ± 0.058	–	–
TrinityAI-Conv-IG	0.89 ± 0.024	0.87 ± 0.020	0.73 ± 0.014	0.71 ± 0.038
TrinityAI-Tx-IG	0.95 ± 0.022	0.89 ± 0.029	0.75 ± 0.033	**0.72 ± 0.038**
TrinityAI-Conv-GradxAct	0.87 ± 0.030	0.88 ± 0.027	0.74 ± 0.030	0.67 ± 0.036
TrinityAI-GradxAct	0.96 ± 0.014	**0.90 ± 0.027**	**0.76 ± 0.027**	0.66 ± 0.029

Detecting Trojaned DNNs Using Counterfactual Attributions. Sikka, Sur, Jha, Roy, Divakaran. ArXiv'21

Semantic Verification of Smaller Models using VLMs

- Formal verification tools (e.g. NNV, Reluplex, Beta-crown, Sherlock) verify robustness (using L_p norm) of representations in the latent space.
- Leverage other large ML models like CLIP and LLMs to "understand" concept representations and verify semantic properties such as "car is likely metallic", "something with a tail is unlikely to be a car"

ResNet18

Number of parameters: 11.7M

CLIP (clip-vit-large-patch14)

Number of parameters: ~500M

Smaller models tend to learn spurious correlations: over-parameterization leads to better generalization and eventually memorization of hard-examples.

Key insight: Can we use larger models to verify smaller models and check whether the relationships learned in the smaller model are consistent with those in the larger model?

We can do so for single examples (runtime monitoring) and we can also check for aggregate relationships in the model (design-time verification).

Semantic Verification of Smaller Models using VLMs





(a) Strength predicates for *truck*



(b) Strength predicates for *car*

Mangal, R., Narodytska, N., Gopinath, D., Hu, B. C., Roy, Anirban, Jha, Susmit, & Păsăreanu, C. S. (2024, July). Concept-based analysis of neural networks via vision-language models. *International Symposium on AI Verification*

Semantic Verification of Smaller Models using VLMs

Quantitative Measure of
Satisfying Spec

$$\sum_i z_i \frac{q_i^{con_2}}{\|q^{con_2}\|} > \varepsilon + \sum_i z_i \frac{q_i^{con_1}}{\|q^{con_1}\|}$$



(a) Strength predicates for *truck* (b) Strength predicates for *car*





Mangal, R., Narodytska, N., Gopinath, D., Hu, B. C., Roy, Anirban, Jha, Susmit, & Păsăreanu, C. S. (2024, July). Concept-based analysis of neural networks via vision-language models. *International Symposium on AI Verification*

Runtime Monitoring Using VLMs



GPT-4o
LLaVA 1.5 (L1.5)
LLaVA 1.6 Mistral (L1.6 Mis)
LLaVA 1.6 Vicuna (L1.6 Vic)
SpaceLLaVA
PaliGemma
Cambrian Phi 3 (C-Phi3)
Cambrian Llama 3 (C-Llama3)
RoadScene2Vec (RS2V)

We investigate the use Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for **extracting spatial relationships** from real images by extracting triplets of the form of (subject, relation, object) from real image datasets such as nuScenes, Waymo, and KITTI.

We used this dataset to **evaluate the spatial reasoning capabilities** of **8 state-of-the-art VLMs** using **4 different prompting strategies** for querying the VLMs

Dataset for evaluating Runtime Monitoring using VLMs

- Datasets such as nuScenes, Waymo, and KITTI consist of driving scenes along with 3D bounding box annotations for objects and other kinds of meta-data, these datasets do not come with ground-truth annotations of spatial relationships between entities.

- We develop a generic framework that can extract ground-truth triplets from scenes using the existing annotations in these datasets.

- We created a **new dataset of road-scenes** annotated with corresponding relationship triplets.

Dataset for evaluating Runtime Monitoring using VLMs

If there is a car within 25m of ego, AND ego speed is > 25 mph, THEN ego acceleration should be negative (braking) in the next time step.

This can be expressed in LTL

- The antecedent describes a scenario in terms of spatial relationships between the ego vehicle and other entities in a scene, while the consequent describes the desired ADS behavior.

- We capture such spatial relationships as triplets of the form <subject, spatial relation, object> suitable for use in LTL monitors

Runtime Monitoring

Model	QM	Time	Total	K	W	N
C-Llama3	1	15.29	0.19	0.15	0.18	0.23
C-Phi3	1	9.85	0.26	0.31	0.26	0.21
GPT-4.o	1	5.89	0.45	0.45	0.37	0.53
L1.5	1	3.95	0.36	0.44	0.35	0.28
L1.5-FT	1	2.57	**0.66**	0.72	**0.67**	**0.59**
L1.5-L	1	2.58	0.65	**0.73**	0.66	0.55
L1.6-Mis	1	3.15	0.36	0.35	0.38	0.35
L1.6-Vic	1	3.65	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.23
PaliGemma	1	1.02	0.33	0.38	0.32	0.30
RS2V	1	0.05	0.27	0.00	0.31	0.51
SpaceLlaVA	1	11.16	0.29	0.39	0.24	0.25

Model	QM	Time	Total	K	W	N
C-Llama3	2	8.71	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.51
C-Phi3	2	8.20	0.52	0.51	0.56	0.49
GPT-4.o	2	108.81	0.42	0.46	0.44	0.37
L1.5	2	5.13	0.45	0.44	0.46	0.44
L1.5-FT	2	4.81	**0.74**	**0.84**	**0.74**	**0.64**
L1.5-L	2	4.84	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.61
L1.6-Mis	2	8.93	0.50	0.47	0.52	0.49
L1.6-Vic	2	8.25	0.45	0.35	0.48	0.50
PaliGemma	2	1.69	0.27	0.31	0.32	0.20
SpaceLlaVA	2	14.44	0.42	0.44	0.47	0.34

Our experiments show that while off-the-shelf VLMs have limited capability on this task, but their performance is significantly improved by **fine-tuning.**

Concentration of distances in high dimensions



Relative distance between random points sampled uniformly from d-dimensional torus

Why should we care?

- All of apparent semantics learning in machine learning relies on using projection of data to a relatively high dimensional space following by using some simple distance metrics such as cosine distance between vectors to determine “semantic similarity”
- As models grow in size and hidden layers become wider, distance concentration would inhibit prohibit semantic learning.



Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior

Joon Sung Park
Stanford University
Stanford, USA
joonspk@stanford.edu

Joseph C. O'Brien
Stanford University
Stanford, USA
jobrien3@stanford.edu

Carrie J. Cai
Google Research
Mountain View, CA, USA
cjcai@google.com

Meredith Ringel Morris
Google DeepMind
Seattle, WA, USA
merrie@google.com

Percy Liang
Stanford University
Stanford, USA
pliang@cs.stanford.edu

Michael S. Bernstein
Stanford University
Stanford, USA
msb@cs.stanford.edu

arXiv:2304.03442v2 [cs.HC] 6 Aug 2023

Figure 1: Generative agents are believable simulacra of human behavior for interactive applications. In this work, we demonstrate generative agents by populating a sandbox environment, reminiscent of The Sims, with twenty-five agents. Users can observe and intervene as agents plan their days, share news, form relationships, and coordinate group activities.



- **generative agents**, powered by LLMs that simulate **believable human behavior**
- Smallville with **25 agents**
- autonomously plan, interact, remember, reflect, and coordinate a Valentine's Day party showcasing emergent, lifelike social dynamics
- 2 day simulation – up to 12 agent diffusion of information

John Lin is a pharmacy shopkeeper at the Willow Market and Pharmacy who loves to help people. He is always looking for ways to make the process of getting medication easier for his customers; John Lin is living with his wife, Mei Lin, who is a college professor, and son, Eddy Lin, who is a student studying music theory; John Lin loves his family very much; John Lin has known the old couple next-door, Sam Moore and Jennifer Moore, for a few years; John Lin thinks Sam Moore is a kind and nice man; John Lin knows his neighbor, Yuriko Yamamoto, well; John Lin knows of his neighbors, Tamara Taylor and Carmen Ortiz, but has not met them before; John Lin and Tom Moreno are colleagues at The Willows Market and Pharmacy; John Lin and Tom Moreno are friends and like to discuss local politics together; John Lin knows the Moreno family somewhat well — the husband Tom Moreno and the wife Jane Moreno.

Generative Agent Simulations of 1,000 People

Authors: Joon Sung Park[1]*, Carolyn Q. Zou[1,2], Aaron Shaw[2], Benjamin Mako Hill[3], Carrie Cai[4], Meredith Ringel Morris[5], Robb Willer[6], Percy Liang[1], Michael S. Bernstein[1]

We present a novel agent architecture that simulates the attitudes and behaviors of **1,052 real individuals**—applying large language models to qualitative interviews about their lives, then measuring how well these agents replicate the attitudes and behaviors of the individuals that they represent. The generative agents replicate participants' **responses on the General Social Survey 85% as accurately as participants replicate their own answers two weeks later.**



Sparse Autoencoders



Sparse Autoencoders



Mapping polysemantic neurons from LLMs' layer to monosemantic encoded space

Sparse Autoencoders



Tinyllama1.1B model's 14 layer activations for 'city'

Train SAE with encoded space 4 times the layer

Interpret encoded space with concepts associated with 'city' such as 'country', 'language' etc.

Patching for 'causal' and 'isolation' scores

Evaluation via patching



SAE Results

Concepts for Objects	Changed Base O/P	Correct Patching O/P
Category	46.15%	34%
Color	46.67%	11.66%
Texture	60.93%	4.2%

Base Input	Base Output	Patched Input	Correct Patched Output
rock: non-living thing; cabbage: plant; dog: animal; apple:	plant	rock: non-living thing; cabbage: plant; dog: animal; chair:	non-living thing
The color of leaf is usually green. The color of coal is usually black. The color of banana is usually	yellow	The color of leaf is usually green. The color of coal is usually black. The color of golf ball is usually	white
rock is hard; towel is soft; door is	hard	rock is hard; towel is soft; pillow is	soft

Base Input	Base Output	Patched Input	Incorrect Patched Output
rock: non-living thing; cabbage: plant; dog: animal; apple:	plant	rock: non-living thing; cabbage: plant; dog: animal; chair:	non-living thing
The color of leaf is usually green. The color of coal is usually black. The color of banana is usually	yellow	The color of leaf is usually green. The color of coal is usually black. The color of golf ball is usually	white
rock is hard; towel is soft; door is	hard	rock is hard; towel is soft; pillow is	soft